- Thesis -- Antithesis -- Synthesis
- Hegel’s Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Model
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Check out my site for more knock-down arguments against this Hermetic theory than you have ever seen before. In other words.
Thesis -- Antithesis -- Synthesis
So let me introduce some terminology. Sentences and beliefs are either true or false. Sentences and beliefs denote states of affairs. Sam isn't true or false because he's neither a belief, thought or sentence. Sam is not a state of affairs either.
Hegel’s Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Model
He's a particular thing. To get contraries or contradictories, you need to consider attributions of properties to particular things or systems.
Here we have two contraries denoted:. These two setences may be true at different times. Sam had black hair when he was younger, and a process ensued that led to his now having white hair. The initial state of affairs reflected a tendency rooted in his DNA. The later state of affairs was due to an aging process that was also an effect of his DNA One tendency pushed out the other over time. This is an example of tendencies that are contraries of each other.
But they are not contradictories. The contradictory of. This statement can be made true by a wide variety of real states of affairs. It would be true if he loses all his hair, it would be true if his hair is black, it would be true if he is a redhead. Sam is not "made up of" all the features he has. If that were true, all those features would be essential to him That's because you'd be saying that Sam is:.
The features that things, or systems, have that they can lose and still exist are accidental to what it is to be that thing or system. These changes occur because of real forces in the world, including tendencies within that thing or system. That's because the particular feature that makes "Sam is not white-haired" true is an accidental feature of him, a feature he could lose.
This is shown by the fact that he loses the black color of his hair over time as his hair becomes white. The sentence "Sam is not white-haired" happens to denote the state of affairs of his being black-haired, but it would have denoted some other feature if he'd been redheaded or had no hair.
But it is equally true that class will "recreate itself" endlessly if the struggle against racism does not become a priority so that the class movement takes on the aims of the anti-racist and anti-patriarchy struggles as its own. The class will be divided and thus overthrowing capital and the state will be impossible. The anti-racist struggle is just as necessary to this aim as worker struggle. Racial division and gender division are not just products of capitalism, but existed in other forms before capitalism, tho not in the modern form.
It's true that capitalism will opportunistically make use of various methods to divide the working class, from deskilling and wage differentials to exacerbating race and gender divisions. Your argument was that class is primary because class struggle is a necessary condition. But anti-racist struggle is equally a necessary condition. You are more on the right lines here. Wangwei was unclear whether his 'negation' sign was a sentential operator, a predicate qualifier, a predicate term modifier or a name adjunct. But you seem to go wrong somewhere, too.
Sentences cannot be equated with beliefs they are not the least bit alike , and you need to specify whether you are referring to token or type sentences, indicative sentences, etc. Logic of course largely deals with propositions. And sentences etc cannot denote 'states of affairs' or they would be names, and that would prevent them from being true or false.
Of course, if the third option were the case, the alleged opposites could not cause change, since they would be produced by it, not the other way round. And they could scarcely be 'internal opposites' if they were produced by change. If the second alternative were correct, then we would see things like males naturally turning into females, the capitalist class into the working class, electrons into protons, left hands into right hands, and vice versa.
A already exists! All that seems to happen is that A disappears.
Thesis - Antithesis - Synthesis - ClickZ
At the very least, this account of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-A itself came about. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere. And pushing the process into the past will merely reduplicate the above problems. Given the above, not-A does not actually alter A, it merely replaces it!
Rosa, when i say that sentences are truth-bearers are true or false , i am referring to sentence tokens, that is, particular utterances or inscriptions. Rosa: "And sentences etc cannot denote 'states of affairs' or they would be names, and that would prevent them from being true or false. How would you define "name"? And if sentences are "names" by your definition, why would that prevent them from being truth-bearers? States of affairs that obtain hold, are actual are facts.
I deal with this somewhat in a long entry on states of affairs for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that i wrote, at:. Descriptive sentences and beliefs differ from names in that we use them to attribute properties to the subject of the sentence or belief. We don't use names to attribute properties to things. Hence, it is not the case that only names can denote or designate something. The state of affairs denoted by this sentence is G.
If he has that ability then that state of affairs is a fact, and "Bush speaks English" is true. The expression "G. Both designate the same state of affairs, but they serve a different social communicative function. Thus Sam's tendency for his hair to turn white coexists with his current causal tendency to maintain his hair's black color because the first tendency is not the actual whiteness of his hair but its possibility.
And the possibility of his hair becoming white is consistent with his hair being actually black. This sort of thing was analyzed by Airstotle over 2, years ago. Moreover, Marx was well aware of Aristotle's writings on this subject because Marx's PhD dissertation was on Aristotle's philosophy of science. You must be mixing up the linguistic expression of a belief with that belief itself.
Beliefs are not as such items of language, and cannot therefore be truth bearers. Well, I do not hink we need a defintion of a name to note the different syntactic role designating expressions play from descriptive ones, for example.
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Since names cannot be true or false, but propositions can, you have another clear distinction here. But, if you think sentences are names then that would introduce a whole series of difficulties you might want to think about, not the least of which is the fact that you can understand sentences you have never heard before, but not names you have never heard before. If both were names, this would not happen. If you can, try to get hold of Peter Geach's article 'Why sentences aren't names' unfortunately published in an obscure Polish journal of semiotics.
But then in addition to the problems noted above you will find it difficult to explain falsehood, for false sentences would then be the 'names' of states of affairs that do not obtain. But if they do not obtain, what then do false propositions actually name?
Falsehoods would be be like fictional names or perhaps not nanes at all , and any larger sentences in which they featured woud become truth-valueless, as senstence depicting say Sherlock Holmes are. Negation would not then turn truth into falsehood, but truth into senselessness. But you can only establish this point successfully by eroding the distinction you yourself depend on, that between naming and describing.
What actually happens is we use predicative expressions and the like to form true or false sentences by combining them with names; we say things of named individuals in such a way. Sentences do not describe individuals, that is what we do with our use of language, and we use predicate etc expressions to achieve that end. Well, I now think you are confusing several more things; facts here with states of affairs if I understood you aright. But what makes you think that ""G. Can it be mapped onto a truth by a predicative etc expression? You can only make this account of yours work by seriously distorting language in this way, using such monstrosities.
And what gives such 'tendencise' their power to do whatever it is they do?
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Yet more 'internal opposites'? Rosa: "You must be mixing up the linguistic expression of a belief with that belief itself.
People all the time say things like, "Your belief is false. They have states of affairs as their targets. Organs or tissues are healthy when they are able to serve their biological function. I agree with Ruth Garrett Millikan that it is a biological function of descriptive sentences to designate states of affairs in the world. If they don't, you'll have a hard time explaining why the sentence production capacity is a product of evolution, an innate biological trait. Why do we have this capacity?